Energy efficiency is one of leading design principles for the current deployment ofcellular mobile networks. A first driving reason for this is that half of the operating costs for thenetwork providers comes from the energy spent to power the network, with almost 80% of it beingconsumed at the base stations. A second reason is related to the high environmental pollution,which makes the green cellular networks deployment mandatory. Cooperation between mobilenetwork providers can be an effective way to reduce the CO2 emissions and, simultaneously, reducethe operating expenditures. In this paper, a game theoretic approach is proposed to introducefairness and stability into an optimal algorithm for switching off the cooperating base stations. Thisaims at making such a solution more attractive in real implementation scenarios where profitdrivennetwork providers act as rational players.

A Game Theoretic Approach to Guarantee Fairness in Cooperation Among Green Mobile Network Operators

Militano L;Molinaro A;Iera A;
2013-01-01

Abstract

Energy efficiency is one of leading design principles for the current deployment ofcellular mobile networks. A first driving reason for this is that half of the operating costs for thenetwork providers comes from the energy spent to power the network, with almost 80% of it beingconsumed at the base stations. A second reason is related to the high environmental pollution,which makes the green cellular networks deployment mandatory. Cooperation between mobilenetwork providers can be an effective way to reduce the CO2 emissions and, simultaneously, reducethe operating expenditures. In this paper, a game theoretic approach is proposed to introducefairness and stability into an optimal algorithm for switching off the cooperating base stations. Thisaims at making such a solution more attractive in real implementation scenarios where profitdrivennetwork providers act as rational players.
2013
Energy efficiency; game theory; fairness
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11770/299819
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