From the flos substantiae to the vortex: A shift in Leibniz's early philosophy

In February 1676, one of Leibniz's main concerns is with the problem of the seat of the soul and its relationship with the body, to which, in two very short papers, he provides two different solutions: the doctrine of the flos substantiae and the vortex theory. By analyzing the former, I suggest that, despite what other scholars claim, it is far from being an earlier exposition of the notion of monad. I argue that this doctrine is entertained by Leibniz only for a period, but is rejected later on and excluded from the final monadic system. This hypothesis seems to be supported by the shift to the notion of a vortex, which-despite having some evident pantheistic and monistic implications-offers a different solution to the problem of mind-body union, by identifying the soul as the only cement of matter. In this article, by following the progress of such a shift, we discover some fascinating nuances in the young Leibniz's development. © 2014 The Author.