By carrying out an in-depth analysis, the paper presents an important “relativisation” towards the «principle of numerus clausus concerning the formation of contracts proceedings» (Chap. I, §§ 7-9) and the complementary «criterion of clear separation between the two phases of bargaining and conclusion of contract» (Chap. II, §§ 1, 2 e 12). The reasoning behind this kind of systematic premise unfolds, by calibrating – in accordance with the legal hierarchy of values – the social utilities that are potentially achievable with these decisionmaking formulas. In this perspective, firstly, the social utility promoted by negative judgement regarding the configurability of a formation of contract proceeding different from the previsions of the statutory law, consists, essentially, in preventing the institutionalisation of multiform practices that are capable of creating a state of constant uncertainty about the enforceability of the promised performances (Chap. I, § 8). Secondly, the “ratio” of the evaluative apparatus, whose aim is to exclude the enforceability of a “self-regulation act” different from the contractual model, also consists in the public policy objectives identified by the technical principle of the «individual legal spheres intangibility/protection» (Chap. I, § 8). In the proposed balancing, a resolutive role is played by the representation that, in particular circumstances, alternative evaluative patterns – that are incompatible whith the previously mentionated principles – are capable of achieving some concretely prevailing public policy targets. Therefore, by acknowledging the enforceability of several contracts perfected in a different way from legal procedures, under certain condictions, it’s possible to satisfy the following superindividual interests: principle of juridical acts economy (Chap. I, § 10); implementation of special market relationships (Chap. I, § 11); social utilities concerning the proceduralisation and conservation of complex business deals (Chap. I, § 12); “weak contractor” protection (Chap. II, § 10). In the same way, by establishing, in particular circumstances, that “self-regulatory acts” other than contracts are binding, it’s reasonable to expect the realization of the following public policy goals: principle of juridical acts economy (Chap. I, § 13); reduction of transaction costs (Chap. I, § 13); e-commerce implementation (Chap. I, § 14); health protection (Chap. I, § 15); investment promotion (Chap. I, § 15); fight against contractual discriminations (Chap. II, § 11); contrast to abuses in subcontracting (Chap. II, § 11).In this theoretical framework, the technical reason, to establish that a contract perfected with an “atypical” proceeding or a “self-regulatory act” not attributable to the contractual paradigm is binding, should be: the Drittwirkung of a supreme principle; the application of a secondary source of legal rules according to the principle of subsidiarity (Chap. III, § 3 ). Regarding the general theory, a decisionmaking system of this kind corresponds to the metaphoric expression «variability of “self-regulamentation acts” conformation» (Chap. III, §§ 3-4), which is an alternative to the vision known as «pancontrattualismo» (Chap. III, § 2). By valuing the role of social utility provided by self-regulation in intersubjective relations, the premises for a massive recourse to the principle of “horizontal” subsidiarity were established (Chap. III, § 4). From this viewpoint, contractual paradigm is not only subjected to reshaping. In some ways, it is also extended to new forms namely: «contract-substitutive of administrative measure» (Chap. III, § 5); «contract-alternative to judicial settlement» (Chap. III, § 5); «contract-source of legal rules» (Chap. III, § 6).
Il lavoro, effettuando un’approfondita analisi della materia, perviene a prospettare una significativa relativizzazione del «principio della tassatività dei procedimenti legali di formazione del contratto» e del complementare «canone della netta separatezza tra la fase delle trattative e quella della conclusione del contratto». Fissata una tale premessa astratta, si motiva, in concreto, la correttezza delle seguenti determinazioni applicative: di ritenere la vincolatività di accordi contrattuali manifestati attraverso condotte difformi da quelle prescritte dalla legge; di riconoscere la giustiziabilità di atti di autonomia irriducibili al paradigma contrattuale, anche in mancanza di un’espressa statuizione legislativa. Le suddette soluzioni operative, però, sono invocabili, soltanto ove ricorra una precisa condizione: occorre dimostrare che l’assetto d’interessi da esse comportato sia necessario per salvaguardare o promuovere un’utilità superiore garantita dai princípi fondamentali o perseguita da una fonte normativa sussidiaria. Sul piano della teoria generale, estrapolando dagli apparati decisori cosí disegnati il riconoscimento all’«autoregolamentazione (anche di matrice contrattuale) dei rapporti tra soggetti pariordinati» della capacità di promuovere importanti obiettivi di politica del diritto, si presentano i presupposti per un massiccio ricorso al principio della sussidiarietà “orizzontale”. Questa motivazione tecnica consente di estendere il paradigma del contratto alle nuove figure del: «contratto sostitutivo di provvedimenti amministrativi»; «contratto alternativo ai provvedimenti giudiziali»; «contratto fonte del diritto».
L'autonomia contrattuale nel prisma della sussidiarietà orizzontale
MAISTO, Filippo
2016-01-01
Abstract
By carrying out an in-depth analysis, the paper presents an important “relativisation” towards the «principle of numerus clausus concerning the formation of contracts proceedings» (Chap. I, §§ 7-9) and the complementary «criterion of clear separation between the two phases of bargaining and conclusion of contract» (Chap. II, §§ 1, 2 e 12). The reasoning behind this kind of systematic premise unfolds, by calibrating – in accordance with the legal hierarchy of values – the social utilities that are potentially achievable with these decisionmaking formulas. In this perspective, firstly, the social utility promoted by negative judgement regarding the configurability of a formation of contract proceeding different from the previsions of the statutory law, consists, essentially, in preventing the institutionalisation of multiform practices that are capable of creating a state of constant uncertainty about the enforceability of the promised performances (Chap. I, § 8). Secondly, the “ratio” of the evaluative apparatus, whose aim is to exclude the enforceability of a “self-regulation act” different from the contractual model, also consists in the public policy objectives identified by the technical principle of the «individual legal spheres intangibility/protection» (Chap. I, § 8). In the proposed balancing, a resolutive role is played by the representation that, in particular circumstances, alternative evaluative patterns – that are incompatible whith the previously mentionated principles – are capable of achieving some concretely prevailing public policy targets. Therefore, by acknowledging the enforceability of several contracts perfected in a different way from legal procedures, under certain condictions, it’s possible to satisfy the following superindividual interests: principle of juridical acts economy (Chap. I, § 10); implementation of special market relationships (Chap. I, § 11); social utilities concerning the proceduralisation and conservation of complex business deals (Chap. I, § 12); “weak contractor” protection (Chap. II, § 10). In the same way, by establishing, in particular circumstances, that “self-regulatory acts” other than contracts are binding, it’s reasonable to expect the realization of the following public policy goals: principle of juridical acts economy (Chap. I, § 13); reduction of transaction costs (Chap. I, § 13); e-commerce implementation (Chap. I, § 14); health protection (Chap. I, § 15); investment promotion (Chap. I, § 15); fight against contractual discriminations (Chap. II, § 11); contrast to abuses in subcontracting (Chap. II, § 11).In this theoretical framework, the technical reason, to establish that a contract perfected with an “atypical” proceeding or a “self-regulatory act” not attributable to the contractual paradigm is binding, should be: the Drittwirkung of a supreme principle; the application of a secondary source of legal rules according to the principle of subsidiarity (Chap. III, § 3 ). Regarding the general theory, a decisionmaking system of this kind corresponds to the metaphoric expression «variability of “self-regulamentation acts” conformation» (Chap. III, §§ 3-4), which is an alternative to the vision known as «pancontrattualismo» (Chap. III, § 2). By valuing the role of social utility provided by self-regulation in intersubjective relations, the premises for a massive recourse to the principle of “horizontal” subsidiarity were established (Chap. III, § 4). From this viewpoint, contractual paradigm is not only subjected to reshaping. In some ways, it is also extended to new forms namely: «contract-substitutive of administrative measure» (Chap. III, § 5); «contract-alternative to judicial settlement» (Chap. III, § 5); «contract-source of legal rules» (Chap. III, § 6).I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.