Personalismo e solidarismo familiare nel diritto internazionale privato

This study intends to demonstrate that the principle of subsidiarity can play a strategic role concerning the application of the foreign laws, when these ones have as object rights aiming at the individual’s tutelage or else at familiar solidarity. The written sources don’t provide expressly the appeal to the principle of subsidiarity to resolve the conflict of laws questions. The reference to a foreign legal system is considered admissible essentially on two conditions: that it is provided by a specific legislative connecting factor; that it is demonstrated the non-contrariness of his rules to the “public policy”. Carrying on to a rational exegesis of this last legislative category, it appears proper to assert the two following assumptions. First of all, such a canon of evaluation, even involving very strong limitations, permits with significant margins the recalling to foreign rules able to remodulate personality rights recognized to the single person as individual, that is as member of a familiar community (chapter I, §§ 5-8). In second place, analyzing the impediments to the efficacy of foreign laws affecting rights or obligations aiming at the familiar solidarity imposed by the judgement of contrariness to the “public policy”, they are rather soft (chapter I, § 11). In the light of the above-mentioned considerations, it is impossible to exclude a priori that some aporias can occur. The aforesaid system could impose the application of foreign law, also where such an operation wouldn’t have a suitable justification (chapter II, § 1). The purpose to always guarantee a suitable axiologic orientation to the application of foreign law can be achieved, setting out the integration of the aforesaid hermeneutical procedure through the employment of the principle of subsidiarity. The legitimacy of such operation can be supported, inferring it, in the first instance, from the canon of the unitariness of the legal system (chapter II, § 3) and, in the second instance, from the parameter of the substantive equality ex art. 3, part 2, cost. (chapter II, § 8). Given the above-mentioned positive references, it seems right to set an essential task in solving the conflicts of laws to the principle of subsidiarity. Reasoning starting from the principle of subsidiarity, the faculty to give effect to a foreign law depends on a further precondition: it is essential to demonstrate that in the transnational cases the foreign source is more suitable to achieve a social usefulness recognized by the constitutional or the EC principles (chapter II, § 7). Carrying out such an evaluation procedure, the interpreter has to disclose some operational rules. The first one is that, when the dispute regards matters concerning existential interests or familiar solidarity, the functional appropriateness of the foreign law must be specifically proved. Unlike the conflicts of laws concerning the merchant relationships, it can’t be presumed (chapter II, § 6). The other one consists on believing that, when a foreign law supports the carrying out of any constitutional or EC values in a concrete case, it has to be recalled – not only in accordance with the specific connecting factor – also in presence of a contrary prevision of the private international law. This hermeneutical rule can be considered the Drittwirkung of the principle of subsidiarity (chapter II, § 8). The thesis goes by the analysis of phenomena of great actuality like: abortion (chapter III, § 1); transsexualism (chapter III, § 1); medically assisted procreation (chapter III, § 2); compensation for damages to the person (chapter III, § 2); polygamous marriages (chapter III, § 4); same-sex marriages and registered partnerships (chapter III, §§ 4, 6); filiation relationships in the Islamic Law (chapter III, §§ 4, 7); adoptions by singles and by homosexual couples (chapter III, § 8); prenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce (chapter III, § 9); forced heirs’ rights (chapter III, § 10); acts affecting inheritance rights (chapter III, § 11).

Per la lettera della legge il riferimento ad una norma civilistica straniera è ammissibile, essenzialmente, a due condizioni: che sia previsto da uno specifico criterio legislativo di collegamento; che sia dimostrata la non contrarietà della disciplina estera all’ordine pubblico. Dato l’obiettivo di garantire sempre un’adeguata giustificazione assiologica all’applicazione delle norme civilistiche straniere, tuttavia, si dimostra l’opportunità di assegnare anche al principio di sussidiarietà un ruolo decisivo nella selezione della disciplina delle fattispecie transnazionali. Il fondamento positivo di un procedimento ermeneutico cosí strutturato può essere individuato, deducendolo dal canone dell’unitarietà dell’ordinamento giuridico e da quello dell’eguaglianza sostanziale. In base al principio di sussidiarietà la norma straniera può operare, soltanto se – soprattutto in considerazione della sua fonte – risulta piú adeguata per realizzare un’utilità sociale apprezzabile secondo i princípi costituzionali o comunitari. Di un simile procedimento valutativo meritano di essere precisati due passaggi logici. Il primo è che, quando la controversia verte su materie concernenti gli interessi esistenziali e la solidarietà familiare, la sussistenza della predetta attitudine deve essere specificamente provata. A differenza dei conflitti normativi concernenti i rapporti mercantili, essa non può essere semplicemente presunta. L’altro consiste nel ritenere che, là dove la norma straniera favorisse nel caso concreto l’attuazione dei valori costituzionali o comunitari, essa dovrebbe essere richiamata anche al cospetto di una previsione contraria della norma di conflitto specifica (cd. Drittwirkung del principio di sussidiarietà).