The Person and «the Thing». Divisions and Intersections, between Esposito and Lacan

In Persons and Things, Esposito discusses the relationship that persons and things entertained over the centuries. The philosopher finds out that this two terms share a common destiny: they are «fractured by the same split». The person would own some features that could allow us to treat it as a thing; on the other hand, in some respects, the thing would consent to be thought similarly to the person. This phenomenon has its roots in a fundamental otherness that resides in each of these terms. But the split can also produce a result extremely hard to manage and tolerate; Esposito gives it a lacanian name: Das Ding. «The Thing», «absolute Other» that «threatens us from inside», «the Real» that reveals its «terrifying aspect», represents one of the results of the split. Can we affirm that the fate suffered by both the person and the thing has the same structure of lacanian Spaltung? The aim of the proposal is to dig around in Esposito’s intuitions, using the lacanian theory about the relationship between the ego and the Other, to reflect on the concept of person and on the possible intersection with the concept of thing.