The present article addresses the issue of the right to life from a double perspective. If – in fact – the protection of life must induce the legislator to introduce particularly effective sanctions to protect this right from unjustified aggression, on the other hand, the punitive claim of the State cannot exclusively consist, in any case, in the neutralization of the offender for life, since this would constitute an exploitation of the human being for contingent porpouses of criminal policy and would be in contrast with the re-educational function of the penalty, as it is provided by the Article 27, par. 3., of the italian Constitution and with the principle of human dignity. A similar prejudice would seem to be recognized in the case of life imprisonment, which – as a perpetual penalty – limits (and we will see later how) any possibility of liberation of the condemned and frustrates his expectations and hopes. In detail, therefore, the paper will examine the recent developments of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Constitutional Court on life imprisonment, trying to highlight the illegality not only of the so-called “life imprisonment impediment” (as it was recently affirmed by the ECHR and by the Constitutional Court) but – more generally – also to life imprisonment in all its forms and to propose – de lege ferenda – possible alternatives to the perpetual sanction, necessary to protect the right to life and hope of the offender.
THE “RIGHT TO LIFE” OF PEOPLE CONVICTED IN ITALY TO LIFE IN PRISON: AMONG RECENT JURISPRUDENTAL ASSESSMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES DE IURE CONDENDO
mario caterini
;
2021-01-01
Abstract
The present article addresses the issue of the right to life from a double perspective. If – in fact – the protection of life must induce the legislator to introduce particularly effective sanctions to protect this right from unjustified aggression, on the other hand, the punitive claim of the State cannot exclusively consist, in any case, in the neutralization of the offender for life, since this would constitute an exploitation of the human being for contingent porpouses of criminal policy and would be in contrast with the re-educational function of the penalty, as it is provided by the Article 27, par. 3., of the italian Constitution and with the principle of human dignity. A similar prejudice would seem to be recognized in the case of life imprisonment, which – as a perpetual penalty – limits (and we will see later how) any possibility of liberation of the condemned and frustrates his expectations and hopes. In detail, therefore, the paper will examine the recent developments of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Constitutional Court on life imprisonment, trying to highlight the illegality not only of the so-called “life imprisonment impediment” (as it was recently affirmed by the ECHR and by the Constitutional Court) but – more generally – also to life imprisonment in all its forms and to propose – de lege ferenda – possible alternatives to the perpetual sanction, necessary to protect the right to life and hope of the offender.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
