This paper analyses the choice between a centralized and a decentralized organizational structure focusing on the relationship existing between the allocation of decision rights, the degree of observability of effort and the use of different compensation systems. Profitable production is realized thanks to good information being available during the project selection stage and hard work being performed in the implementation stage. Selection of projects may be made by the principal (hierarchy) or by the agent (delegation). Under the hierarchical system, the principal’s participation in the design of projects allows her to gather useful information for the design of a more accurate compensation system. Therefore, we analyse the trade-off between optimal use of available information and accuracy of incentive systems, which emerges in the choice of organizational form.
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|Titolo:||Effort Observability, Incentive Systems and Organizational Forms|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2010|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|