In this paper, we propose a dynamical model of technology adoption for the exploitation of a renewable natural resource. Each technology has a different efficiency and environmental impact. The process of technology adoption over time is modeled through an evolutionary game employed by profit maximizing exploiters. The loss in profits due to lower efficiency levels of environmentally-friendly technologies can be counterbalanced by the higher consumers’ propensity to pay for greener goods. The dynamics of the resource take place in continuous time, whereas the technology choice can be revised either in continuous-time or in discrete-time. In the latter case, the model assumes the form of a hybrid system, whose dynamics is mainly explored numerically. We shows that: (1) overexploitation of the resource arises whenever the reduction in harvesting due to a lower efficiency of clean technology is more than compensated by a higher propensity to pay for greener goods; (2) the difference between the fixed costs of these technologies can be exogenously fixed to provide an incentive for adopting clean technology without affecting the long-run level of the resource; and (3) in some cases, discrete switching of the technology causes overshooting in the dynamics whereas in others it enhances the stability of the system.
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|Titolo:||Exploitation of renewable resources with differentiated technologies: An evolutionary analysis|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2015|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|