SAUSSURE AND THE WILL

In his Geneva lectures in November 1891, Saussure stated a sort of “paradox of the will,” saying: “Can linguistic facts be said to be the result of acts of will? That is the question. The current science of language gives a positive answer. However, one should add immediately that ... the linguistic act, if I might call it that, is characterized as being the least reflected on, the least premeditated, as well as the most impersonal of all.” This issue – shared with Michel Bréal – remains important in Saussure’s thought until the end, and it is possible to read some of the most important pages of his works in the light of this paradox – a kind of free will problem in a linguistic fashion. Such a focus on the will opens a different perspective on semiology (“For the distinguishing characteristic of the sign – but the one that is least apparent at first sight – is that in some way it always eludes the individual or social will”– as we read in the Course), reassesses the status of notions like “institution” and “arbitrariness” and allows a (critical) comparison with other paradigms in the current debate of social ontology (e.g., Searle’s account).