The essay focuses on the idea that the content considered intrinsic to the principle of presumption of guilt is the product of specific ideological choices, ranging between a higher sensitivity to social defence and individual guarantees. This conclusion is confirmed by the historical social debate in Italy, the classical school up to the Republican Constitution, the positivist school's ideas, and those of the technical-juridical school. Then the paper opens to a comparative perspective, by analyzing certain aspects of the presumption of guilt in some European state systems, both from a constitutional point of view and from the point of view of the disciplines specifically pertaining to the different juridical cultures; they leave us doubts about the legitimacy of normative and interpretation models, which seem to consider some elements of the cases in point as being implicit in the tangible fact or to be assessed by presumptions, with a possible inversion of the burden of proof. After an excursus about the homogenizing role of the presumption of guilt within a supranational perspective, the research focuses on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, highlighting some of its ambiguities and contradictions as regards the admission of 'reasonable' waivers of the presumption of guilt as a rule of evidence. The same critical observations concern the proposal of the EU directive about the consolidation of the idea of the presumption of guilt, which, instead, paradoxically seems to weaken its content of defence of civil rights. The research deals with some hypotheses undermining the principle with the help of the substantive penal law, such as the ideas of presumed danger or intention and guilt, underlining, on the contrary, the necessity of an integrated vision of the penal system, imposing a model of a trial being consistent with that of the substantive law defending civil rights. Conclusions are devoted to the risk, due to a misunderstood punishment efficiency, of a substantially new interpretation, from a probative point of view, of substantive penal guarantees showing how the case law and European norms in the course of development can influence this. Finally, they also deal with the critical points and ambiguities in evaluating the reasonableness of waivers of the principle and of in the balance between social defence and individual guarantees made according to equivocal and incontrollable parameters leaving space to illegitimate solutions
Il saggio si sviluppa dal concetto secondo cui il contenuto attribuito al principio di presunzione d’innocenza è il frutto di precise scelte ideologiche, che oscillano tra una maggiore sensibilità per la difesa sociale oppure per le garanzie individuali. Ciò trova conferma nel dibattito storico italiano, dalla scuola classica sino alla Costituzione repubblicana, passando per le idee della scuola positiva e di quella tecnico-giuridica. Il lavoro si apre poi verso una prospettiva comparatista, analizzando certi aspetti della presunzione d’innocenza in alcuni ordinamenti statuali europei, sia sotto il profilo costituzionale, sia sotto quello di discipline proprie delle diverse culture giuridiche che lasciano dubbi sulla legittimità di modelli, normativi e interpretativi, tendenti a considerare alcuni elementi della fattispecie impliciti nel fatto materiale o da accertarsi mediante presunzioni, con eventuale inversione dell’onere probatorio. Dopo un excursus sul ruolo omogeneizzante della presunzione d’innocenza nell’ottica sovrannazionale, la ricerca coinvolge la giurisprudenza della European Court of Human Rights e della European Court of Justice, evidenziandone alcune ambiguità e contraddizioni con riferimento all’ammissione di deroghe ‘ragionevoli’ alla presunzione d’innocenza come regola probatoria. Analoghi rilievi critici vengono svolti a proposito della proposta di direttiva UE sul rafforzamento della presunzione di innocenza, che, invece, paradossal-mente sembra affievolirne il contento garantista. La ricerca affronta anche alcune ipotesi paradigmatiche di svuotamento del principio attraverso il diritto penale sostanziale, come i concetti del pericolo presunto o del dolo e della colpa presunti, sottolineando viceversa la necessità di una visione integrata del sistema penale che imponga un modello processuale conforme a quello garantista di diritto sostanziale. Le conclusioni sono dedicate al rischio, seguendo un malinteso efficientismo punitivo, di una sostanziale riscrittura in chiave probatoria del sistema di garanzie penali sostanziali, rilevando come in ciò possa incidere la giurisprudenza e la normativa europea in fieri, nonché le criticità e ambiguità delle valutazioni di ragionevolezza delle deroghe al principio e di bilanciamento tra difesa sociale e garanzie individuali, in base a parametri sfuggenti e incontrollabili che lasciano spazi a soluzioni illegittime.
Presunzione di elementi della fattispecie versus presunzione di non colpevolezza
CATERINI, Mario
2016-01-01
Abstract
The essay focuses on the idea that the content considered intrinsic to the principle of presumption of guilt is the product of specific ideological choices, ranging between a higher sensitivity to social defence and individual guarantees. This conclusion is confirmed by the historical social debate in Italy, the classical school up to the Republican Constitution, the positivist school's ideas, and those of the technical-juridical school. Then the paper opens to a comparative perspective, by analyzing certain aspects of the presumption of guilt in some European state systems, both from a constitutional point of view and from the point of view of the disciplines specifically pertaining to the different juridical cultures; they leave us doubts about the legitimacy of normative and interpretation models, which seem to consider some elements of the cases in point as being implicit in the tangible fact or to be assessed by presumptions, with a possible inversion of the burden of proof. After an excursus about the homogenizing role of the presumption of guilt within a supranational perspective, the research focuses on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, highlighting some of its ambiguities and contradictions as regards the admission of 'reasonable' waivers of the presumption of guilt as a rule of evidence. The same critical observations concern the proposal of the EU directive about the consolidation of the idea of the presumption of guilt, which, instead, paradoxically seems to weaken its content of defence of civil rights. The research deals with some hypotheses undermining the principle with the help of the substantive penal law, such as the ideas of presumed danger or intention and guilt, underlining, on the contrary, the necessity of an integrated vision of the penal system, imposing a model of a trial being consistent with that of the substantive law defending civil rights. Conclusions are devoted to the risk, due to a misunderstood punishment efficiency, of a substantially new interpretation, from a probative point of view, of substantive penal guarantees showing how the case law and European norms in the course of development can influence this. Finally, they also deal with the critical points and ambiguities in evaluating the reasonableness of waivers of the principle and of in the balance between social defence and individual guarantees made according to equivocal and incontrollable parameters leaving space to illegitimate solutionsI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.