In an evolutionary delegation game, we investigate the effects on market outputs of different levels of information about the way managers are compensated. When managers are informed about their opponents, the long–run configuration of the industry depends on market conditions. When managers are informed only of the current composition of the population, only profit maximizing firms survive, no matter what market condition prevails. However, if we further lower the level of information –by hiding the current composition of the industry– then we show how managers’ beliefs affect the long run equilibrium.

Control delegation, information and beliefs in evolutionary oligopolies

DE GIOVANNI, Domenico;LAMANTIA, FABIO GIOVANNI
2016

Abstract

In an evolutionary delegation game, we investigate the effects on market outputs of different levels of information about the way managers are compensated. When managers are informed about their opponents, the long–run configuration of the industry depends on market conditions. When managers are informed only of the current composition of the population, only profit maximizing firms survive, no matter what market condition prevails. However, if we further lower the level of information –by hiding the current composition of the industry– then we show how managers’ beliefs affect the long run equilibrium.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11770/145470
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 12
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 10
social impact