“The challenge of abstract concepts”

Abstract concepts ('freedom') differ from concrete ones ('cat'), as they do not have abounded, identifiable and clearly perceivable referent. The way in which abstractconcepts are represented has recently become a topic of intense debate, especiallybecause of the spread of the embodied and grounded approach to cognition. Withinthis framework concepts derive their meaning from the same perception, motor andemotional systems that are involved in online interaction with the world. Most of theevidence in favour of this view, however, has been gathered with regard to concreteconcepts. Given the relevance of abstract concepts for higher-order cognition, weargue that being able to explain how they are represented is a crucial challenge thatany theory of cognition needs to address. The aim of this article is to offer a criticalreview of the latest theories on abstract concepts, focusing on embodied ones. Startingwith theories that question the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts, wereview theories claiming that abstract concepts are grounded in metaphors, insituations and introspection, and in emotion. We then introduce multiple representationtheories, according to which abstract concepts evoke both sensorimotor and linguisticinformation. We argue that the most promising approach is given by multiplerepresentation views that combine an embodied perspective with the recognition of theimportance of linguistic experience. We conclude by discussing whether or not a singletheoretical framework might be able to explain all different varieties of abstractconcepts