Most food products can be classified as credence goods, and regulations exist to provide consumers with a substitute for the lacking information and trust. Rather than having no regulation in place, producers of high-quality goods are better off when a compromise is reached that leads to an imperfect regulation. Some of the producers of low-quality goods benefit by cheating under a not fully credible regulation. Even producers of low-quality goods who will never label their products as being of high quality may profit from the introduction of an imperfect regulation.
Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fully Trusted?"
NISTICO', Rosanna;
2004-01-01
Abstract
Most food products can be classified as credence goods, and regulations exist to provide consumers with a substitute for the lacking information and trust. Rather than having no regulation in place, producers of high-quality goods are better off when a compromise is reached that leads to an imperfect regulation. Some of the producers of low-quality goods benefit by cheating under a not fully credible regulation. Even producers of low-quality goods who will never label their products as being of high quality may profit from the introduction of an imperfect regulation.File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.