The very idea of a terminus a quo can be conceived in a different way if we take a look to the (seemingly) strange use of the word ‘instinct’ made by Peirce, Saussure, and Wittgenstein. The peculiar indistinctness between what is native and what is learned – which is no more accepted in the current cognitive era – actually is the main feature of language as the distinctive character of man, so that we always must start from linguistic behaviour, taken as a whole (and maybe Barthes was right in putting Semiology under Linguistics).
Naturale o primo? L'istinto come terminus a quo
Emanuele Fadda
2018-01-01
Abstract
The very idea of a terminus a quo can be conceived in a different way if we take a look to the (seemingly) strange use of the word ‘instinct’ made by Peirce, Saussure, and Wittgenstein. The peculiar indistinctness between what is native and what is learned – which is no more accepted in the current cognitive era – actually is the main feature of language as the distinctive character of man, so that we always must start from linguistic behaviour, taken as a whole (and maybe Barthes was right in putting Semiology under Linguistics).File in questo prodotto:
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