The article focuses on the effects produced by the Prodi-Kinnock managerial reform on the relationship between politics and administration in the European Commission. By adopting an analytical perspective based on Public service bargain (PSB), the article analyses the changes which took place in the fields of competence of commissioner, cabinet members and officials. At the same time it examines how the officials’ career structure has changed after the implementation of the reform. The research demonstrates that the P-K reform determined a shift from a consensual PSB characterized by the interdependence between the three actors, to a PSB where commissioner and cabinet members hold a predominant position.
Vecchi e nuovi equilibri nella Commissione Europea
Tarditi V
2014-01-01
Abstract
The article focuses on the effects produced by the Prodi-Kinnock managerial reform on the relationship between politics and administration in the European Commission. By adopting an analytical perspective based on Public service bargain (PSB), the article analyses the changes which took place in the fields of competence of commissioner, cabinet members and officials. At the same time it examines how the officials’ career structure has changed after the implementation of the reform. The research demonstrates that the P-K reform determined a shift from a consensual PSB characterized by the interdependence between the three actors, to a PSB where commissioner and cabinet members hold a predominant position.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
