The paper studies the dynamics of compliance in a population of taxpayers that can decide whether to engage in tax evasion. In addition, these agents are subject to control by auditors who also choose to engage in dishonest behavior and request a bribe for not reporting detected tax evasion. We investigate the rich, dynamic scenarios that may arise through the interaction of auditors and taxpayers and describe how corruption cycles may emerge
Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers
De Giovanni D.
;Lamantia F.;
2023-01-01
Abstract
The paper studies the dynamics of compliance in a population of taxpayers that can decide whether to engage in tax evasion. In addition, these agents are subject to control by auditors who also choose to engage in dishonest behavior and request a bribe for not reporting detected tax evasion. We investigate the rich, dynamic scenarios that may arise through the interaction of auditors and taxpayers and describe how corruption cycles may emergeFile in questo prodotto:
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