¿Hay espacio para el federo-regionalismo en tiempos de emergencia? Cooperación, conflictividad y resiliencia en el marco jurídico europeo

The object of analysis is the impact of federo-regionalism on the decisions taken by some European States in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, within the framework of a “constitutional law of crises” or “emergencies”. Starting from the erroneous equation “Decentralized State + emergency = chaos and inefficiency”, I will analyze the “turns of emergency” hat have led to an incisive acceleration of the centripetal dynamic in some European systems with a decentralized organization of power, going from to a “physiological” to a “pathological centralization”. The pandemic is analyzed in the dimension of a complex intergovernmental problem rather than in the “crisis”, given the centrality that intergovernmental coordination and cooperation assumes in the effectiveness of the response of federo-regionalisms. The aim is to analyze if and how the pandemic has not produced direct or automatic changes, but it has functioned as a strong “accelerator” of processes already underway, especially regarding to the system of intergovernmental relations that has become central axis in the management of the pandemic emergency.