This paper critically examines the Report approved by the Joint Commission of the High Council of the Judiciary (November 12, 2024) on the current state of Residences for the Execution of Security Measures. After reconstructing the historical and legislative trajectory of psychiatric deinstitutionalization in Italy – initiated by Law n. 180/1978 and culminating in the closure of Judicial Psychiatric Hospitals through Law n. 81/2014 – the author highlights how certain proposals in the Report, particularly the establishment of high-security facilities for allegedly “unamendable” individuals and the transfer of REMS management to the Ministry of Justice, represent a regression from the constitutional principles of health and human dignity. These proposals, rooted in a custodial and stigmatizing view of mental illness, are incompatible with the personalist principle (Art. 2 Const.) and the rehabilitative function of punishment (art. 27 Const.), and contradict established constitutional jurisprudence. The essay reaffirms the centrality of care as an emancipatory – not merely therapeutic –practice, drawing on the thought of Franco Basaglia and anti-institutional psychiatry, and underscores the inviolability of the right to mental health, even for individuals who have committed criminal offenses.
Critica di una discutibile Relazione sulle REMS presentata al CSM
Ugo Adamo
2025-01-01
Abstract
This paper critically examines the Report approved by the Joint Commission of the High Council of the Judiciary (November 12, 2024) on the current state of Residences for the Execution of Security Measures. After reconstructing the historical and legislative trajectory of psychiatric deinstitutionalization in Italy – initiated by Law n. 180/1978 and culminating in the closure of Judicial Psychiatric Hospitals through Law n. 81/2014 – the author highlights how certain proposals in the Report, particularly the establishment of high-security facilities for allegedly “unamendable” individuals and the transfer of REMS management to the Ministry of Justice, represent a regression from the constitutional principles of health and human dignity. These proposals, rooted in a custodial and stigmatizing view of mental illness, are incompatible with the personalist principle (Art. 2 Const.) and the rehabilitative function of punishment (art. 27 Const.), and contradict established constitutional jurisprudence. The essay reaffirms the centrality of care as an emancipatory – not merely therapeutic –practice, drawing on the thought of Franco Basaglia and anti-institutional psychiatry, and underscores the inviolability of the right to mental health, even for individuals who have committed criminal offenses.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


