As Wilke already supposed, in Philodemus’ De ira, col. XXVII 28-29 Indelli there is a reference to Heraclitus’ fr. 70 Marcovich (= DK 22 B 85). The paper contextualizes this passage, compares it with the classical Epicurean theory of affections and tries to point out its philosophical peculiarities, while also taking into account the influence probably exerted on it by some treatises on anger of prominent Early and Middle Stoic philosophers. Almost all the scholars have considered the Heraclitean echo in Philodemus as a passive reception of the Aristotelian position on Heraclitus’ psychology. Yet, it can be proven that Philodemus, thanks to his eclecticism but also to his original philosophical awareness, autonomously reworks pre-Aristotelian texts and some gnomological sources which go back at least to archaic tragedy and lyric poetry. For that reason, the reuse of Heraclitus’ fr. 70 Marcovich in Philodemus’ De ira is probably more than an echo. It can be useful for understanding the role played by θυμός in the thought of Heraclitus and explaining its relationship to ὀργή, even leaving Aristotle aside. The case of Philodemus as a 'reader’ of Heraclitus shows how the Stoic intermediation in De ira is not merely a polemical paraphrase or an ideological assent. On the contrary, it calls for an in-depth assessment of Philodemus’ originality. Although this originality stands out only at intervals from the Herculanean texts, it cannot be neglected if the Epicurean thinker is to be given a more appropriate place in the history of ancient philosophy.
Il fr. 70 Marcovich di Eraclito (= DK 22 B 85) nel De ira di Filodemo. Praesocratica Herculanensia III
Christian Vassallo
2013-01-01
Abstract
As Wilke already supposed, in Philodemus’ De ira, col. XXVII 28-29 Indelli there is a reference to Heraclitus’ fr. 70 Marcovich (= DK 22 B 85). The paper contextualizes this passage, compares it with the classical Epicurean theory of affections and tries to point out its philosophical peculiarities, while also taking into account the influence probably exerted on it by some treatises on anger of prominent Early and Middle Stoic philosophers. Almost all the scholars have considered the Heraclitean echo in Philodemus as a passive reception of the Aristotelian position on Heraclitus’ psychology. Yet, it can be proven that Philodemus, thanks to his eclecticism but also to his original philosophical awareness, autonomously reworks pre-Aristotelian texts and some gnomological sources which go back at least to archaic tragedy and lyric poetry. For that reason, the reuse of Heraclitus’ fr. 70 Marcovich in Philodemus’ De ira is probably more than an echo. It can be useful for understanding the role played by θυμός in the thought of Heraclitus and explaining its relationship to ὀργή, even leaving Aristotle aside. The case of Philodemus as a 'reader’ of Heraclitus shows how the Stoic intermediation in De ira is not merely a polemical paraphrase or an ideological assent. On the contrary, it calls for an in-depth assessment of Philodemus’ originality. Although this originality stands out only at intervals from the Herculanean texts, it cannot be neglected if the Epicurean thinker is to be given a more appropriate place in the history of ancient philosophy.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
